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The present issue of Concepts & Methods features a special 
issue on quantitative methods for the study of spatial interde-
pendence. It is timely for two reasons.  First, our columns have 
recently displayed several essays about conceptualisation of 
policy learning in qualitative research (see Biegelbauer in 3 (1), 
2007; Wieken-kamp as well as Loeber in 4 (1), 2008).  Second, 
there is a growing scientific interest in understanding interde-
pendence due to real or perceived developments of intercon-
nectivity in society and economy (e.g., EU, globalization). Half of 
the nearly 800 articles referring to the phenomenon of “policy 
diffusion” that were published in top political science journals in 
the past half century appeared in the last decade1. 
Much too often, however, the possibility of interdependence 
is simply neglected in political science research. Robert Fran-
zese and Jude Hays forcefully warn us against such omission, 
stressing the dire consequences of doing so (i.e., overestimation 
of non-spatial effects). While providing insights into the bias and 
efficiency properties of a range of estimators, they remind us of 
the methodological importance to distinguish the three sources 
of spatial association of common exposure, contagion, and 
selection, of which only contagion is true interdependence. 
Achim Kemmerling illustrates spatial modeling with the ex-
ample of labor market policies in OECD countries.  His study 
shows not just that there is (some) interdependence in labour 
market policies of advanced countries, but also makes clear that 
spatial modeling is a powerful method that allows distinguishing 
between alternative causal mechanisms. At the same time, he 
shows the extent to which results depends on the specific 
weights chosen and hence he warns against an atheoretical 
modeling approach. 
The next essay by Covadonga Meseguer looks at one par-
ticular mechanism of interdependence, namely policy learning.  
She argues that Bayesian updating offers an appropriate ap-
proach to the identification and operationalization of learning. 
Focusing on governments' decision to privatize, she demon-
strates that governments in advanced and Latin American coun-
tries learn from both the experience in their region and from the 
experience in the world. 
Studying interdependence (or diffusion processes)  with 
spatial lags and spatial weights is not all there is in the quantita-
tive toolkit. Fabrizio Gilardi discusses an alternative dyadic ap-
proach. Because the units of analysis are pairs of countries, this 
approach makes it possible to identify more clearly from which 
other country a given country is learning. 
 
All together, the four papers show that spatial modeling can 
add important insights to time-series cross-section approaches 
to studying political macrophenomena, but also highlight the fact 
that no analytical decisions taken in this context are innocuous. 
While they give an overview of some techniques available for 
modeling interdependence, it should not be forgotten that the 
usual datasets on which these techniques can be used are 
rather small, contain only limited information, and are based on 
often ambivalent measures. This however, is shared with any 
other technique that is used to study macrocomparative re-
search questions. Another challenge that has not yet been tack-
led is the question to what extent process of policy diffusion vary 
over time. Spatial lags just summarize the relation between two 
countries over the whole period studied. As periods studied are 
increasing in length, influence may change. But such thoughts 
tend to be heretic -- one has to summarize something in order to 
identify a model. 
In the last contribution of this issue, Peter Biegelbauer takes 
one of Concepts & Methods objectives to heart by engaging 
Anne Loeber's comments on his earlier thoughts about how to 
narrow down the concept of learning to render it empirically 
traceable and hence useful.  This discussion highlights differ-
ences but also points of agreement or convergence between 
various approaches to learning. 
msw@uni-oldenburg.de 
Bernhard Kittel 
Chief editor 
 
Damian Raess 
Guest editor 
 
 
 
D I T O R I A L E 
————————————————————————— 
1 See Graham, Volden and Shipan (2008) “The Diffusion of 
Policy Diffusion”, paper presented at the APSA Annual 
Meeting 2008, Boston.  
Bernhard Kittel 
is professor of social science methodology at the 
Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg, Ger-
many 
bernhard.kittel@uni-oldenburg.de 
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The Broad Substantive Range of Spatial Interdepend-
ence  
Social-scientific interest in and applications of spatial 
modeling have burgeoned lately, due partly to advances 
in theory that imply interdependence and in methodology 
to address it; partly to global substantive developments 
that have raised perception of and attention to intercon-
nectivity, at all levels, from micro/personal to macro/
international; and partly to advances in technology for 
obtaining and working with spatial data. This is a wel-
come development because the dependence of out-
comes in some units on outcomes in others, spatial inter-
dependence, is substantively ubiquitous and theoretically 
quite central across the political and other social sci-
ences. 
Perhaps the most-extensive classical and current 
interest in spatial interdependence surrounds intergov-
ernmental diffusion of policies and institutions among 
U.S. States.1 Similar policy-diffusion research has more-
recently emerged in comparative studies, but perhaps 
the closer parallel in terms of classical and current inter-
est in comparative and international politics is  
institutional/regime diffusion, which dates at least to 
Dahl’s (1971) classic Polyarchy and is much invigorated 
since Starr’s (1991) “Democratic Dominoes”, Hunting-
ton’s (1991) Third Wave, and the fall of the Soviet Union. 
The topical range of substantively important spatial-
interdependence extends well beyond such inter-
governmental diffusion, however, spanning all of political 
science. Inside democratic legislatures, representatives’ 
votes depend on others’ (expected) votes, and, in elec-
toral studies, citizens’ votes, election outcomes, or candi-
date qualities, strategies, or contributions in some con-
tests depend on those in others. In micro-behavioral 
work, too, much of the surging interest in contextual/
neighborhood effects surrounds effects on respondents’ 
behaviors or opinions of aggregates of others’ (e.g., 
those of his/her community or social network). Contagion 
or diffusion in social-movements, national identity, and 
ideology has also been explored. In comparative and 
international political economy, too, interdependence is 
often substantively large and central. Many stress cross-
national diffusion as a force behind recent economic lib-
eralizations. Even more broadly, globalization, i.e., inter-
national economic integration, arguably today’s most-
notable (and indisputably its most-noted) political-
economic phenomenon, implies strategic (and nonstrate-
gic) interdependence of domestic politics, policymakers, 
and policies. Likewise, the ignition and outcomes of 
coups, riots, civil wars, and revolutions in one unit also 
depend on those in others. Terrorist origins and targets 
manifest spatial patterns too. As for international rela-
tions, the interdependence of states’ actions might serve 
for definition of the subfield. In fact, we might even argue 
that the interdependence of outcomes across units could 
serve reasonably as definition for social science. Interde-
pendence is indeed studied prominently in geography, 
regional, and environmental sciences, in regional, urban, 
and real-estate economics, in medicine, public health, 
epidemiology, and criminology, and, in its related guise 
as network-dependence, in medicine, health, and epide-
miology again, in education, and, of course, in social-
network studies. Topics include, to name just a few, in-
terdependence in macroeconomic performance; micro-
Contagion, Common Exposure and 
Selection: Empirical Modeling of 
Theories and Substance of Interde-
pendence in Political Science 
ROBERT J.  
FRANZESE, JR. 
& JUDE C. HAYES  
————————————————————————— 
1 The ensuing list of topics, subjects, and disciplines 
corresponds to literature searches for applied work 
under contagion, spatial interdependence, or network 
dependence. A web appendix (at www.umich.edu/
~franzese/Publications.html) provides full citation to 
these (many) works, with some annotation, topically 
organized in the order presented here in the text. 
Likewise, throughout this article, the citations given 
are often abbreviated versions of fuller reference lists 
given sequentially in the web appendix. This includes 
complete references and links to our own work sub-
stantiating various conclusions and conducting vari-
ous methodological and empirical analyses summa-
rized here. 
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economic preferences/utilities; technology, marketing, 
and other firm strategies; violence and crime; obesity, 
fertility, birthweight, child development and poverty; mar-
riage; right-wing extremism; (sub)national identity; 
women’s ordainment; and every academic’s favorite: 
citations, placements, and co-authoring.  
II. Tobler's Law, the Myriad Mechanisms, and a Gen-
eral Theoretical Model of Interdependence 
In short, as Tobler's Law (Tobler 1970) aptly sums: 
“Everything is related to everything else, but near things 
are more related than distant things.” Furthermore, as 
Beck et al.'s (2006) pithy title reminds in corollary: 
“Space is More than Geography.” The substantive con-
tent of the proximity in Tobler's Law, and so the path-
ways along which interdependence between units may 
operate, extends well beyond physical distance, contact, 
and contiguity (as several examples above attest). Long 
literatures in regional science, geography, and sociology 
carefully elaborate from those disciplinary perspectives 
the multifarious mechanisms by which contagion may 
arise. Simmons and colleagues offer a list for interna-
tional relations: coercion, competition, learning, and emu-
lation.2 In fact, as, e.g., Brueckner (2003) showed, strate-
gic interdependence arises any time some unit(s)’s ac-
tions affect the marginal utility of other(s)’s actions. Given 
such externalities, i’s utility depends on both its policy 
and that of j.3 In environmental policy, for instance, do-
mestic welfare (or net political-economic benefits to poli-
cymakers) in each country will depend on the actions of 
both due to environmental spillovers (e.g., of pollution) 
and economic ones (e.g., in regulatory costs). Optimizing 
behavior will yield best-response functions of i's optimal 
policies as a function of j's and vice versa. In this frame, 
positive externalities create free-rider incentives, which 
induce policies to move in opposite directions (i.e., as 
strategic substitutes), confer late-mover advantages, and 
make war-of-attrition (strategic delay or inaction) dynam-
ics likely. Conversely, negative externalities create stra-
tegic complementarity, with policies moving in the same 
direction, yielding early-mover advantages and competi-
tive races.4 
III. Empirical Methods for Spatial Interdependence: 
Specification, Estimation, & Interpretation  
Empirically, the clustering or correlation of outcomes on 
some dimension(s) of proximity, spatial association, is 
also obvious across a vast array of substantive contexts. 
However, and this is the crux of the great empirical chal-
lenge/opportunity represented by the substantive and 
theoretical ubiquity of interdependence, outcomes may 
evidence spatial association for at least three distinct 
reasons, only the second of which is true interdepend-
ence (arising by one or more of the mechanisms listed 
above). First, units may be responding similarly to similar 
exposure to similar exogenous internal/domestic or ex-
ternal/foreign stimuli (common exposure), or, second, 
unit(s)'s responses may depend on others' responses 
(contagion).5 We may find states' adoptions of some eco-
nomic treaty, for example, to cluster geographically or 
along other dimensions of proximity, e.g., bilateral trade-
volume, because proximate states experience similar 
exogenous domestic or foreign political-economic stimuli 
or because each state's decision to sign depends on 
whether proximate others sign. A third possibility arises 
when the putative outcome affects the variable along 
which clustering occurs (selection). Treaty signatories 
might also cluster according to some variable on which 
we observe their proximity (volume of trade between 
them) because being co-signatories affects that variable 
(spurs bilateral trade). The theories and policy advice 
supported by any observed spatial association hinges 
critically on whether (or the relative degrees to which) 
state signatories cluster in pockets of dense trade rela-
tions because those states tend to experience similar 
exogenous conditions that favor signing, because the 
signing by some states spurs their trading partners to 
sign, or because the treaty fosters trade between co-
signatories. 
Severe empirical difficulties confront the accurate 
estimation and distinction of these alternative sources of 
spatial association: (1) domestic/internal factors, exoge-
nous-external/foreign factors, and context-conditional 
responses to exogenous-external conditions; (2) cross-
unit interdependence; and (3) the effects of interdepend-
ence on the proximity of units. We emphasize that, re-
gardless of how one's interests weigh among 
(exogenous) internal/domestic, external/foreign, or con-
————————————————————————— 
2 E.g., Elkins & Simmons (2005) and Simmons et al. 
(2006). For a fuller, closer match to prior traditions, 
add cooperation and externality to competition, com-
bine learning and emulation as one, and add reloca-
tion diffusion (Haegerstrand 1970)- meaning the di-
rect movement of some components of units i into 
other units j, such as by human migration or disease 
contagion. Note that aspects of these mechanisms 
may induce spatial association by common-exposure 
or selection effects, as opposed or in addition to by 
interdependence (see below). For example, learning 
from other units implies contagion, whereas learning 
from one's own experiences could implicate com-
mon-exposure sources of spatial association insofar 
as units' experiences and lessons correlate spatially. 
3 In such microeconomic models, externalities could 
arise from interactions, expectations, and/or prefer-
ences (Manski 2000); furthermore, non-strategic in-
terdependence could arise even without externalities. 
Examples and reviews of micro-theoretical models 
with explicit interdependence include Akerlof 1997; 
Glaeser et al. 2000, 2003; Brock & Durlauf 2001 
———————————————————————— 
4 We eschew the terms race to the bottom (or top) 
and convergence because these competitive races 
need not foster convergence to top, bottom, or 
mean, and could spur divergence (see below and, 
for related further discussion of the observable re-
garding convergence, Plümper & Schneider 2006) 
5 This is the famous Galton's Problem, and is related 
to Manski's Reflection Problem (1993), which in part 
is a formalization of Galton's profound comment 
revealing its full implications. 
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text-condition effects for one, contagion/diffusion for an-
other, and/or network-selection for a third, valid infer-
ences regarding any of these possibilities generally re-
quires empirical modeling that specifies and estimates all 
of them well because the three typically look much alike 
empirically and so the relative omission or inadequacy in 
the empirical model and estimates of any one will bias 
inferences in favor of the other(s) most similar to it. We 
next discuss briefly how to specify and estimate empirical 
models to make such distinctions and then how to inter-
pret and present effectively the results. 
Much of our previous work6 has focused on estimat-
ing and calculating effects in regression models of spatial 
or spatiotemporal interdependence. The spatiotemporal-
lag model, which reflects both spatial and temporal dy-
namics, can be expressed thus:  
 
The dependent variable, y, is an NTx1 vector of cross 
sections stacked by period (i.e., all N units’ first-period 
observations, then the N second period observations, 
and so on, to the N for period-T). ρ is the spatial autore-
gressive coefficient, and W is an NTxNT block-diagonal 
spatial-weighting matrix. Wy is thus the spatial lag; i.e., 
for each observation, yit, Wy is a weighted sum of the 
other units’ outcomes, yjt, with weights {wij}t reflecting 
relative connectivity from j to i (which may be constant or 
vary across each period t). Wy thus captures directly the 
dependence of each unit i’s outcome on unit j’s; crucially, 
the researcher prespecifies W as the theories and sub-
stance at hand suggest. ρ is the strength of interdepend-
ence, in that prespecified pattern, to be estimated. M is 
an NTxNT matrix with ones on the minor diagonal (i.e., at 
(N+1,1), (N+2,2),…(NT,NT N)), and zeros elsewhere, so 
My is just the familiar (first-order) time-lagged depend-
ent-variable, with φ its coefficient. X contains NT obser-
vations on k independent variables—the exogenous non-
spatial explanators, i.e., the common-exposure compo-
nents of domestic/unit-level, contextual/exogenous-
external, and context-conditional factors—with β their 
kx1 vector of coefficients. Lastly, ε is an NTx1 vector of 
stochastic components, assumed independent and iden-
tically distributed.7 The spatiotemporal-lag model thus 
captures temporal and spatial dynamics in familiar form, 
regressing the outcome, yit, on exogenous non-spatial 
explanators and controls, xit, a time-lagged dependent-
variable, yi,t-1, and a weighted average of the dependent 
variable in other units, Σjwijyjt, with the weights, wij, re-
flecting the relative connectivity from units j to unit i.8 
We have evaluated the bias and efficiency properties 
several estimators for (1) including non-spatial least-
squares (LS), spatial least-squares (S-LS), spatial two-
stage least-squares (S-2SLS), and spatial maximum 
likelihood (S-ML) among others. The first of these esti-
mators (LS) omits spatial lags and is therefore subject to 
omitted variable bias. S-LS includes spatial lags but ig-
nores their endogeneity, inducing simultaneity bias. S-
2SLS avoids the simultaneity bias using spatial instru-
ments (i.e., weighted averages of unit-level variables in 
neighboring units) to purge the spatial lag of its correla-
tion with the error term, but it is typically inefficient rela-
tive to S-ML. 
Our central findings are that LS, by ignoring spatial inter-
dependence fosters overestimation of non-spatial effects, 
i.e., unit-level (domestic, individual) and contextual 
(exogenous-external) effects. These biases quickly grow 
substantively sizeable at even very modest interdepend-
ence-strength (ρ>.1±) and become gargantuan at greater 
ρ. Given any noticeable interdependence, then, non-
spatial LS is an unmitigated disaster. S-LS, conversely, 
suffers simultaneity biases that foster misestimation, 
usually overestimation, of contagion-strength, usually 
inducing oppositely signed errors for (i.e., underestima-
tion of) non-spatial factors’ roles. These simultaneity bi-
ases generally remain mild at weaker interdependence 
(ρ<.25±), and S-LS is also rather efficient, but standard-
error accuracy is very poor in smaller-T samples (as, in 
the most-extreme example, in pure cross-sections).9 The 
biases of LS concentrate in the unit-level and exoge-
nous-external factors that correlate most with the omitted 
spatial dependence. Conversely, the simultaneity bias 
that typically inflates estimated interdependence in S-LS 
induces corresponding attenuation biases in the esti-
mates of non-spatial explanatory roles, especially for 
factors exhibiting spatial correlation most similar to the 
pattern of dependent-variable interdependence. In de-
gree also, relative omission or misspecification of the 
spatial or non-spatial component of the model fosters 
underestimation of the strength of the relatively poorly 
specified component and over-estimation of the better-
specified component. Substantively for political scien-
tists, then, relatively poor specifications of domestic/
micro/individual-level or of exogenous external/macro/
contextual-level components (common exposure) will 
tend to bias conclusions to favor contagion, and vice 
versa.10 
The most important issue methodologically, then, is 
adequate modeling both of interdependence, including 
accurate and empirically powerful specification of W, and ———————————————————————–—-- 
6 We have recently begun to consider network-
selection effects jointly with contagion and common-
exposure, and ours is the first such attempt to our 
knowledge to do so directly. Something similar to 
incorporating all three is possible in applications of 
the framework developed by Snijders and colleagues' 
coevolution-model framework (Snijders 1997, 2005; 
Leenders 1997), and its accompanying software, 
SIENA, but only rather indirectly (from our perspec-
tive). 
7 Alternative distributions of ε are possible but add 
complication without illumination. 
————————————————————————— 
8 Typically, one row-normalizes W such that Σjwij=1  
and so Σjwijyjt is a weighted average. This affords 
certain econometric and substantive conveniences, 
but is not necessarily substantively neutral (see 
Pluemper & Neumeyer 2008ab). 
9 An aspect of (one of ) Manski‘s Reflection Problem(s) 
again. 
10 Galton’s Problem (and its related Manski Problems) 
once more. 
εβϕρ +++= XMyWyy (1) 
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of the non-spatial component of the model (i.e., unit-level 
and exogenous-external factors). Selecting properly con-
sistent estimators, and which one, is somewhat secon-
dary but also becomes important as interdependence 
strengthens. In that consideration, S-ML emerges from 
our explorations as nearly dominating S-LS or S-2SLS. 
Other issues remain to explore—e.g., relative robustness 
of the estimators to misspecification or assumption viola-
tion—but our analyses so far suggest only simplicity and 
availability of software to facilitate/automate estimation 
remain in argument for S-LS or S-2SLS.11 
Given an estimate of , the next step is interpretation 
of those estimates. Assuming a well-specified model and 
an effective estimator, one can read the statistical signifi-
cance of spatial interdependence from and of non-spatial 
factors from in the usual manners. However, calculation, 
interpretation, and presentation of substantive effects in 
empirical models with spatio-temporal interdependence, 
as in any model beyond those strictly linear-additive in 
variables and parameters,12 involve more than simply 
considering coefficient estimates. In empirical models 
with spatio-temporal dynamics, as in those with only tem-
poral dynamics, the coefficients on explanatory variables 
give only the (often inherently unobservable) pre-
dynamic impetuses to outcomes from changes in those 
variables. To calculate “immediate” spatiotemporal re-
sponses—post-spatial but pre-temporal feedback—and 
the spatiotemporal responses over time (in all N units) to 
counterfactual shocks to X or ε,13 we need the spatial 
multiplier, as seen best from the (Nx1) vector form of the 
model: 
To find the long-run, steady-state, equilibrium 
(cumulative) level of y (in all N units) to permanent 
counter-factual shocks to X and/or ε we set yt-1 equal to y 
in and solve:14 
To offer standard-errors for these effect estimates, we 
have shown how to use the delta method.15 These for-
mula give the responses of all units {i} to hypothetical 
shocks to x or ε in any unit(s) {j}, including possibly 
shocks in {i} itself or themselves, by inserting those coun-
terfactual shocks in Xtβ+ε in the row(s) corresponding to 
{j}. These calculations allow interpretation and tabular, 
graphical, and/or cartographical presentation of substan-
tive spatial effects and dynamics, such as in these 
(shrunken) examples from our own work (see web ap-
pendix): 
See figures on the next page 
Top to down, these show a tabulation of the esti-
mated long-run steady-state responses of labor-market 
training expenditures (LMT) in each EU country to coun-
terfactual LMT shocks in the others, a graph of the esti-
mated spatiotemporal response-path of capital taxes in 
France to a counterfactual structural-unemployment 
shock in Germany (from analyses extending Swank & 
Steinmo 2002), and a map of the estimated long-run 
steady-state LMT responses in Europe to a counterfac-
tual LMT shock in Germany.  
Lately, we introduced (to political science) spatial-
probit models of interdependence in binary outcomes, 
exploring Bayesian (MCMC) and frequentist (recursive 
importance-sampling: RIS) estimators’ performances and 
(more originally ours) calculation of spatial-dynamic ef-
fects in terms of outcome probabilities (with associated 
certainty estimates), rather than in parameter or latent-
variable terms as in existing work. 
Lastly, we have begun consideration of “multiple-W” 
models, in part as an approach to estimating rather than 
prespecifying relative connectivities, an approach that, 
unlike the few extant, more exclusively inductive, ap-
proaches, is structural and capable of distinguishing the 
three sources of spatial association.16 Multiple-W models 
also allow specification of relative connectivity between 
units in each W according to alternative mechanisms of 
interdependence, thereby affording direct empirical 
evaluation of those alternative mechanisms. 
 
—————————————————————————- 
11 The first-order concern, though, we reiterate, is not to 
omit or give short-shrift to interdependence; how best 
to estimate models that properly include it is secon-
dary. 
12 As familiar examples, linear-interaction models are 
explicitly nonlinear in variables though linear-additive 
in parameters; logit/probit models are explicitly 
nonlinear in variables and parameters; and tempo-
rally (or spatially or spatiotemporally) dynamic mod-
els are implicitly nonlinear in parameters and vari-
ables. 
13 Conceptually useful is to decompose ε into fixed η 
plus stochastic γt and to consider shocks to ε as oc-
curring in η. 
14 Given stationarity, the LRSS of any temporary shock 
is zero. Assuming row-normalization, stationarity re-
quires |q+φ|<1. 
—————————————————————————- 
15 That is, we give a first-order Taylor-series linear-
approximation to nonlinear around the estimated pa-
rameter-values and determine the asymptotic variance 
of that linear approximation. Parametric bootstrap 
techniques can also be used to calculate these uncer-
tainty estimates. See web appendix for specific cita-
tions. 
16 The few existing approaches to estimating W are gen-
erally spatial-statistical rather than spatial-econometric 
in philosophy (roughly: non-structural rather than struc-
tural), and conditional rather than simultaneous autore-
gressive (roughly: inductive data-exploratory rather 
than deductively structured inferential). Network-
analytic approaches to estimating ties between units, 
meanwhile, generally do not consider the simultaneous 
effects of those ties or the structure of those ties on 
units or of other units’ outcomes or characteristics on 
each unit via the network of ties. (Snijders and col-
leagues have gone the furthest from this direction, 
though the approach is rather indirect for our aims: see 
note 6.) 
⇒+++= − ttttNt XyyWy εβϕρ 1 [ ]tttNNt XyWIy εβϕρ ++−= −1)(
(2) 
⇒+++= − ttttNt XyyWy εβϕρ 1 [ ] )(1 ttNNNt XIWIy εβϕρ +−−= −
(3) 
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C um ul a tiv e  1 5 -P e ri o d  E ff ec t:  - .9 4 3
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Further web appendices to earlier work offer StataTM 
code for maximum-likelihood estimation of spatial-
autoregressive models and for calculating spatial dynam-
ics, effects, and standard errors, etc., plus MatLabTM 
code and Lotus 1-2-3TM *.wk1 files of data, including con-
tiguity matrices, for replication of those papers’ estima-
tions.17 
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for LMPs: competition, learning, and global trends.  To 
begin with the first, one may assume that LMPs have 
spillover effects from one country to another: if country A 
enhances employment possibilities for its people, some 
people from a (neighboring) country B commute or emi-
grate to A. This reduces both the need for country B to 
implement similar measures and the effectiveness of the 
programs in country A. In this case country A’s policy 
leads to opposite reactions in country B. In the long run A 
also starts cutting its programs. In that sense national 
LMPs compete with each other (Franzese/Hays 2006). 
Competition should make activation difficult and incenti-
vation more attractive. 
A different mechanism is to think that a government 
in country A learns from policies in country B (e.g. Mese-
guer 2006). There may be several forms of learning, but 
here I simply assume that A’s government is uncertain 
about the effectiveness of a specific LMP. In that case it 
may use country B’s experience as a benchmark: A’s 
government should imitate policies of more successful 
countries with better labor markets. This could apply to 
both activation and incentivation policies. 
Finally, one may argue that the logic of reforms in 
LMPs follows more a global trend than strategic or infor-
mational concerns. Governments in this sense are highly 
bounded in their rationality and use international trends 
in LMPs as crucial cues for their own policies. One may 
also think of this mechanism as a form of naïve learning 
in which governments merely emulate the behavior of 
other countries. Again, common trends serve as key sig-
nals for individual governments. Both arguments imply 
that countries should align their LMPs in activation and 
incentivation to the global mean.  
The use of spatial lags and spatial weights 
A spatial lag is an explanatory variable that gives an av-
erage of values for the dependent variable for 
'neighboring' countries. Spatial lags are similar to tempo-
ral lags in time-series analysis in which data for the de-
pendent variable of, say, the previous year is used as an 
explanation for the current year. The specific nature of 
the average depends on the weights you choose for all 
other countries. Hence it depends on the notion of 
The Weights You Choose, The Odds 
You Get: Using Different Spatial 
Weights. The Example Of Labor  
Market Policies 
 
ACHIM  
KEMMERLING 
Introduction 
More and more, researchers of comparative and interna-
tional politics apply spatial econometrics to different 
causal claims about international diffusion (e.g. Simmons 
et al. 2006). Usually they estimate a model with a spatial 
lag and vary the matrix of spatial weights in accordance 
with the underlying theory. I will use the example of the 
international interaction between national labor market 
policies (LMPs) to show that such a methodology bears 
both opportunities and risks. 
For comparative political economists LMPs are no 
obvious case of diffusion; different welfare state tradi-
tions loom large into reform processes. However, policy 
advisers have increasingly looked for benchmark cases 
abroad. There is also growing empirical evidence that 
national LMPs influence each other (Franzese/Hays 
2006, Kemmerling 2007). In the following I will look for 
evidence of international policy diffusion for two different 
types of reform in LMPs. The first type of reform is 
'activation', i.e. shifting passive measures such as unem-
ployment benefits into active schemes of training or job 
creation. The second type of reform is 'incentivation', i.e. 
cutting unemployment benefits and thereby increasing 
pressure on the unemployed to accept new jobs. 
Mechanisms of Diffusion 
The theoretical literature on policy diffusion, transfer and 
interaction is very heterogeneous since it taps into many 
different economic, sociologic and even psychological 
theories. Arguably because of this heterogeneity, most 
scholars avoid the term theory, but use the concept of a 
causal mechanism instead. Mechanisms include different 
forms of learning, social imitation, or competition. Some 
scholars have embedded these different mechanisms in 
a single decision-theoretic framework (Braun/ Gilardi 
2006). However, not all of these mechanisms are based 
on the same meta-theoretical assumptions and can be 
subjected to the same kind of empirical tests. Moreover, 
some of these mechanisms produce empirically very 
similar predictions. 
For the sake of simplicity I will assume these theoreti-
cal problems away and will focus on three mechanisms 
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tion the relative length of borders a country shares with 
others. In this case the rationale is that the longer a com-
mon border, the higher the incidence of economic exter-
nalities between national LMPs. The validity of border 
length as a proxy for externalities has a sound basis in 
the literature (for details cf. Kemmerling 2007). For both 
matrices I expect that the sign of the coefficient ρ is 
negative, i.e. if LMPs in neighboring countries increase, 
the incentive for a given country is to decrease its own 
LMP. 
The third matrix uses differences in unemployment 
rates between two countries. The argument is that a 
country copies LMPs from countries that have a better 
performing labor market and avoids policies of countries 
with a worse performance. This is my proxy of policy 
learning and I expect a positive coefficient in the estima-
tions, since countries should copy LMPs of countries that 
have lower unemployment rates and should avoid poli-
cies of countries that have higher unemployment rates. 
The measure could be more sophisticated, but it catches 
the gist of the current debate on benchmarking and best 
practices in LMPs. 
The fourth matrix puts equal weight on all countries in 
the sample. In this case the spatial lag is simply the arith-
metic mean of all remaining (K-1) countries, and is meant 
to capture common (intellectual) trends in LMPs. I expect 
a negative relationship, since countries with higher 
(lower) LMPs relative to the mean should decrease 
(increase) their policies. In all four cases I did row-
standardize the data. 
Some Results 
Using a spatial lag is not without perils, since it intro-
duces endogeneity into the estimation and violates a 
condition of the classic model of ordinary least-squares 
(OLS) regression. Franzese and Hays (2006) argue that 
this disturbance is not very large if the strength of spatial 
correlation is not very large. This is the case for my 
analyses and the reason why I only report the results of a 
simple spatial OLS regression. I operationalized activa-
tion as the ratio of active to passive LMP in a country 
using the OECD Social Expenditure Database for 23 
countries over the period 1980-2001. I use Lyle 
Scruggs’ (2004) net replacement rate for unemployment 
benefits for 18 countries between 1971 and 2002 as a 
measure of incentivation. Similar to Franzese and Hays I 
use one regression model for each spatial weight matrix 
described above. Thus I estimate four regressions all of 
which also include a temporal lag, fixed time and country 
dummies and a battery of controls such as the rate of 
unemployment and the partisan ideology of ruling gov-
ernments. The table omits all these and focuses directly 
on the coefficients for the spatial lags (for details cf. 
Kemmerling 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
'neighborhood' and, in particular, on the causal mecha-
nism you assume to be of importance. It is the chosen 
theory which decides how countries are connected with 
each other and which countries should matter more for a 
given country than others. 
The typical time-series-cross-section regression with a 
spatial lag has the form 
 
The dependent variable is yit for N countries (or other 
units) and T years. The spatial lag is yjt, i.e. observations 
of y for all countries except for country i at time t. It is 
convenient to denominate these other countries with a 
new index j ≠ i. The spatial lag is weighted by a matrix Wt 
at time t, and ρ measures the spatial coefficient of corre-
lation. Xit is the familiar set of K independent variables for 
each country and year, and the regression coefficients β 
and the error term ε also follow the familiar model of mul-
tiple regressions. 
If we omit the time index, the typical matrix for spatial 
weights for country i has the form 
,  
where the wijs are usually row-standardized, i.e. .
 
Each wij represents the weight of country j on the 
policy of country i. All diagonal elements wii are set to 
zero, since a country cannot spatially affect itself by defi-
nition. Row-standardizing means that the spatial lag is a 
weighted average of the observations of other countries. 
Compare the following example: The U.S. has only two-
contiguous neighbors, Mexico and Canada. If your theory 
is that only close geographic links matter and you want to 
describe a U.S. policy as the result of Mexican and Ca-
nadian policies you have to ascribe these two countries 
spatial weights that add up to one. If you further believe 
that border length proxies strength of influence you will 
have the following weights for the U.S.: 
The U.S.-Mexican border is 3141km and the U.S.-
Canadian border 8893km. Hence Canada should have 
roughly three times as much influence on U.S. policies 
as Mexico. The weights of both countries add up to one, 
since by definition the weight of the U.S. on itself is 0. 
In my case of LMPs I use four different matrices. The 
first matrix is based on binary contiguity and attaches 
positive weight only on neighboring countries. This tries 
to capture the effect of cross-border movements in em-
ployed people and hence the potential competition ef-
fects between countries. However, such a crude meas-
ure of geographic proximity is a variable that could be 
employed for many different theories. Therefore I use a 
second, more specific matrix which takes into considera-
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First, weights may be endogenous. For instance, 
unemployment rates could be the result of LMPs. In fact, 
the theory of externalities needs to assume that policies 
have an impact on the labor market. The theory is only 
valid, if activation measures reduce unemployment in 
both the country from which the policy originates and its 
neighbors. In that case one would need to endogenize or 
instrument the weights based on labor market perform-
ance (Franzese et al. 2008). An easier, but less satisfac-
tory solution is to use only those weights that are clearly 
exogenous weights. In our example this means that the 
matrices based on contiguity are much less vulnerable to 
endogeneity than the matrix based on the differences 
between national unemployment rates. 
Second, the specification of spatial weights has an 
enormous influence on the result (e.g. Plümper/
Neumayer 2008). For instance, row-standardization has 
the advantage that the spatial lag amounts to a weighted 
average, but it puts strong restrictions on the process of 
spatial contagion. Take the contiguity data as an exam-
ple. Since all weights add up to one, a country with one 
neighbor such as New Zealand receives all its cues from 
Australia, but is equally dependent on external cues than 
a European country with 6 or 7 neighbors and many oth-
ers nearby. We have to judge on basis of our theory 
whether this is plausible. If theory does not guide your 
specification it is recommendable to experiment with 
several modifications to probe the robustness of your 
results. For instance, the difference between binary and 
metric weights in the case of contiguity does not affect 
the sign of the coefficients very much, but it affects its 
significance. 
Third, the small-sample properties of spatial weights 
have yet to be fully explored. Take the global mean 
which is strongly influenced by the inclusion or exclusion 
of a single country in a sample of 20 countries. Say we 
compute the arithmetic mean of activation for all coun-
tries but Sweden. Since Sweden is a well-known case of 
high levels of activation, the global mean for all other 
countries drops. Remember that we have to exclude 
Sweden from the computation of the global mean. In a 
cross-country comparison there will be a negative spatial 
correlation, but this correlation is the product of an arith-
metic manipulation. We should not confuse this with a 
theoretically meaningful process of diffusion in which 
countries want to realign on a global trend. To test the 
robustness of small and non-random samples bootstrap-
ping is an important tool, but it needs to be adjusted for 
spatial econometrics. 
A last caveat using spatial weights is the temporal 
stability of the coefficients. Many theories such as strate-
gic learning or competition would actually predict a tem-
poral pattern in which first movers begin to deviate in the 
short run and only after some time other countries follow. 
Think again about labor market policies. A country such 
as Belgium might learn that it benefits from French acti-
vation measures. As a consequence it starts cutting its 
LMP. After some time France will find out that some of 
the benefits of its LMP go to Belgium and will also start 
cutting its programs. Hence we would expect a diver-
gence in the short and a convergence of policies in the 
Table: Abridged Regression Results 
 
Levels of significance: * < .1, ** < .05  
 
We see that of all four spatial weights, only metric 
contiguity produces a significant result and only for the 
case of activation. We also see that the sign for both 
border measures is negative, implying a strategic inter-
dependence. Neighbors seem to compete with each 
other, especially if one takes into consideration the rela-
tive length of a shared border: If in neighboring countries 
the relationship between active and passive LMPs in-
creases by one percent, this relationship drops in the 
given country by 0.132 percent. Compared to competi-
tion we do not see much evidence for a common trend 
nor the case of learning: both are insignificant and the 
trend even bears the wrong sign. Let us turn to the sec-
ond area of reform, incentivation. Here we do not find 
any significant effects at all. The signs of the coefficients 
imply that geographic neighbors seem to copy directly 
from each other and that the case for strategic competi-
tion and externalities is much weaker. 
Some pitfalls 
Given that many recent contributions have found evi-
dence for spatial interdependence future analyses need 
to shift their focus from omitting diffusion to exaggerating 
it. Take the example of the often cited tipping-point mod-
els in which countries are more likely to join the band-
wagon of a new policy innovation if a critical mass of 
countries has already done so. Empirically these models 
look very much like an S-curve in which contagion takes 
off slowly, then accelerates, and finally fades out again. 
However, a similar S-curve is to be expected if all coun-
tries are hit by an international shock and the speed of 
adjustment after this shock is normally distributed. De-
ducing diffusion from a simple S-curve may therefore 
lead to a case of spurious diffusion. Do different spatial 
lags bear similar risks? 
It is obvious that the link between the respective the-
ory and the weights is decisive and that the weights can 
only be as good as the underlying theory. For instance, 
my operationalization of the argument about learning 
was not very sophisticated. Models of Bayesian updating 
(cf. Meseguer this issue) do much more justice to the 
way how policy-makers process information. Leaving 
these theoretical concerns aside, I will focus in the fol-
lowing on some practical problems in the implementation 
of spatial weights. 
Spatial Lag Activation Incentivation 
Competition     
Binary Contiguity -0.08 (0.08) 0.041 (0.047) 
Metric Contiguity -0.132 (0.06)** 0.059 (0.044) 
Learning     
UR-Weighted Lag 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
Global Trend     
Arithmetic Mean 0.20 (0.16) -0.009 (0.830) 
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long run. Temporal stability is also a major issue if the 
underlying data does not vary enough or if random 
shocks have lasting effects (so-called non-stationarity). 
Take the European Union (EU) as an example. If we find 
that EU members have more similar LMPs nowadays, do 
we believe that this is due to a process of diffusion or do 
we believe that EU countries are exposed to a common 
lasting shock such as the introduction of a monetary un-
ion? In the latter case we do not find regional diffusion, 
but a common (stochastic) trend. 
Conclusions 
Using spatial lags is an intriguing methodology for the 
analysis of international policy diffusion. It is important for 
both econometric and substantive reasons. Since it is a 
relative newcomer to the field of comparative and inter-
national politics, applied research has yet to fully grasp 
some of the peculiarities of this methodology. Until these 
problems are fully understood one needs to check the 
robustness of the results carefully and to improve the 
links between theory and operationalization.  
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Learning from Others1 
 
 
 
COVADONGA   
MESEGUER 
The Problem 
In political science, and particularly in International Politi-
cal Economy, there has been an increasing interest in 
measuring horizontal influences among countries as de-
terminants of policy choices. One such mechanism of 
horizontal influence is learning from the experience of 
others. In its simplest form, learning entails looking at the 
results (political or economic) of policies carried out by 
others in order to reduce the uncertainty that usually ac-
companies the making of economic policy. Whichever 
the version of political learning one embraces, learning 
involves politicians holding particular beliefs about the 
outcomes of a policy. To reduce that uncertainty, politi-
cians look at others' experience. That information is in 
turn used to revise politicians' initial beliefs and eventu-
ally (one can hypothesize) decide on policies on the ba-
sis of what has been learned.  
Note two important starting assumptions. Learning 
entails that governments hold beliefs with some uncer-
tainty. If governments do not doubt their beliefs, that is, if 
they are dogmatic, the motivation to learn vanishes. 
Thus, for learning to take place, initial beliefs have to be 
vague. Second, a politician or government interested in 
learning from others faces several informational con-
straints: even if she is a rational learner (that is, even if 
she makes the most efficient use of all available informa-
tion), there are costs in the acquisition of that informa-
tion. Hence, governments may not use all potential infor-
mation simply because it is costly to access it. Beyond 
this constraint, making the most efficient use of the ex-
perience of others implies giving more weight to informa-
tion that is based on many observations. It also entails 
giving more value to information that is consistent, that is 
to say, less noisy information2. A particular government 
that doubts whether to privatize may look at the experi-
ence of other countries that privatized before. If in a good 
number of countries privatization was followed by better 
economic performance, a rational politician would update 
its initial beliefs with that information and conclude that 
privatization is a good way to spur economic growth.3  
The literature on economic policy making, and in par-
ticular, the literature on economic policy reform is per-
vaded by stories of this type: policies are adopted be-
cause they work. Policies are abandoned (providing a 
policy alternative exists) because they no longer work. 
Economic policy making is then portrayed as a process 
of continuity punctuated by moments of policy change. 
The change is generally associated to deep economic 
crises that question the validity of previous beliefs 
(among many others, see Tommasi and Velasco, 1995). 
The challenge is to test empirically whether this sort of 
rational behavior has any leverage in explaining actual 
policy choices against other possible explanations. This 
test has proved elusive so far given the difficulty in op-
erationalizing learning in a way amenable for cross-
national empirical research. I argue that Bayesian updat-
ing holds great potential to tackle the operationalization 
conundrum.  
 
—————————————————————————- 
1 This summary is based on Meseguer (forthcoming, 
2009) 
—————————————————————————- 
2 According to theories of bounded learning, there are 
biases in the processing of information. Actors use 
severa l  heur is t ic  dev ices (avai lab i l i t y , 
representativeness and anchoring) which distort the 
way the experience of others is processed. Applied to 
policy making, these biases entails that governments 
pay more attention to experiences that are close, 
they draw excessive optimistic conclusions on the 
basis of a limited stream of information and, when 
adopting policies, policy makers make little 
adaptations. The most comprehensive application of 
this model in the policy diffusion literature is Weyland 
(2007). See also Tetlock (2005). 
3 Whether this particular politician will eventually liber-
alize does not follow immediately, of course. Even if 
governments are persuaded of the technical virtues 
of a particular policy, it may not be adopted for a host 
of political or ideological reasons. Thus, rational pol-
icy choices may not automatically follow rational 
learning.  
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The Setting 
Assume that governments can express their initial uncer-
tainty about the expected economic growth following the 
implementation of alternative policies, j = {A, B}, by 
means of a probability distribution.4 These alternative 
policies may be liberalize or protect trade, liberalize or 
close the capital account, so on and so forth. Growth, X, 
is assumed to be a random variable, normally distributed, 
with an unknown mean, M, and an unknown variance, V. 
Governments learn about these two unknown parame-
ters by observing the results of other countries under 
alternative policies. These two parameters are random 
variables, too.  
In the specification of prior beliefs for this kind of set 
up, the conditional distribution of the mean is normally 
distributed5. The marginal distribution of the variance is 
scaled Inverse-χ2. In this prior Normal/scaled Inv-χ2, the 
distributions of the mean and the variance are interde-
pendent.6 Thus, for policies j = {A, B} 
The four parameters are the location (µ) and the 
scale (σ2/τ) of the mean, M, the degrees of freedom (υ) 
and the scale (σ2) of the variance, V. τj is the factor that 
relates the prior variance of the mean to the sampling 
variance. At time t, governments observe the perform-
ance of alternative policies A and B in other countries. 
Suppose that nA countries followed policy A and that nB 
countries followed policy B. Hence, the following informa-
tion about performance of policies A and B becomes 
available at time t. 
Assume these new data are drawn from normal distri-
butions. Also, assumed that these observations are inde-
pendent and identically distributed (i.i.d). The sample 
mean,    , and the sample sum of squares, Sj, are suffi-
cient statistics to summarize the information in the sam-
ple of countries under each of the policies A and B. 
New information in combination with prior beliefs pro-
duces posterior beliefs, that is, updated beliefs embody-
ing observed policy results under A and B. The useful 
feature of Bayesian updating is that it offers a mecha-
nism of rational learning based on Bayes's theorem. 
Bayesian updating provides updating equations for the 
parameters of interest, that is, mean and variance, 
after observing nj outcomes of policy. 
In common parlance, governments start with certain 
prior beliefs about average growth and the variability of 
growth for policies A and B (for instance, liberalizing and 
not liberalizing trade). New information is gathered and 
governments update their beliefs about growth and its 
variability under alternative policies according to equa-
tions (3) - (4) below. Equations (3) and (4) provide the 
posterior point estimates for the two parameters that can 
be used as operationalizations of learning in cross na-
tional statistical analysis: the posterior for the location 
and the posterior for the scale. These posterior beliefs 
become priors the following year. Under the assumption 
that samples gathered consecutively are independent, 
the rational updating of beliefs proceeds sequentially.  
With a Normal/scaled Inv-χ2 conjugate prior and a 
normal likelihood as described above, the posterior value 
of the location (3) and the posterior value for the scale 
(4) have the following shapes.7 For each country i, time t 
and policies j = {A, B}  
n is the sample size, Sit is the posterior for the sum of 
squares, υit  is the posterior for the degrees of freedom, 
and τit is the posterior for the factor that relates the prior 
variance of the mean to the sampling variance. 
The above equations may look rather obscure, and 
an immediate reaction to them is that no real policy 
maker would ever undertake the heroic task of calculat-
ing posterior beliefs in order to make a decision. Yet, for 
all its complication, equation (3) implies that posterior 
beliefs are a compromise between prior beliefs and the 
information conveyed in the observed sample of coun-
tries carrying out alternative policies. The bigger the 
sample size, n, the more weight the sample information 
has in forming posterior beliefs compared with prior be-
liefs. Thus, posterior beliefs will be mostly driven by data 
rather than by prior beliefs. By proceeding in this way, it 
is possible to generate series of posterior beliefs about 
expected performance based on past experience and the 
experience of others and use those posteriors as proxies 
of learning.  
An illustration 
Governments' utility can be expressed as a positive func-
tion of posterior beliefs about growth, say, privatizing and 
not privatizing. If governments choose the policy that 
maximizes their utility, a decision problem can be stipu-
lated based in the comparison of expected utilities under 
alternative policies. The probability of adopting a particu-
lar policy can then be estimated as a function of the dif-
ference in posterior beliefs under one and the other pol-
—————————————————————————- 
4 Note that this setting assumes that governments 
want to learn about the success of a particular policy 
measured in terms of economic growth. Other 
outcomes of interest, including political outcomes, 
may be considered, of course. 
5 Marginally, the mean has a t-Student distribution. 
6 This is a strong assumption but it does not seem to 
be unrealistic. The dependency means that if σ2 
(which is the sampling variance of growth) is large, 
then a prior distribution with high variance is induced 
on µ. —————————————————————————- 
7 Gelman et al. (2004: 79).  
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icy (policies A and B in a generic way).  
 
The table below shows the results of estimating the 
impact of learning on the decision to privatize in thirty 
seven advanced and Latin American countries 
(Meseguer 2004). The dependent variable is a dichoto-
mous indicator of privatization. The variables OWN RE-
SULTS, AVERAGE REGIONAL RESULTS, AND AVERAGE 
WORLD RESULTS were calculated using equation (3).8 I 
employed as prior beliefs data from actual performance 
of countries privatizing and not privatizing the year before 
a particular country enters the database. The information 
to update prior beliefs was the average growth results for 
countries that privatized and countries that did not privat-
ize. To account for any possible discrimination of infor-
mation, I distinguished the own past experience from the 
experience in the region a particular country belongs to 
(average growth results in the region) and from the ex-
perience in the world (excluding the own and the regional 
experience). 
According to the results (and disregarding the other 
control variables), in the joint sample, learning from the 
experience in the region and learning from the experi-
ence in the world with privatization is positively related to 
the probability that a particular country privatizes. In 
other words, the probability of privatizing is greater if 
governments' posterior beliefs about performance privat-
izing exceed the posterior beliefs about performance not 
privatizing after learning from the experience in the re-
gion and in the world. The results change slightly by re-
gion, with Latin American learning from their own past 
experience and the experience in their region and ad-
vanced countries being more influenced by the perform-
ance beyond their borders. 
See table 1 on the next page 
More to be learned 
Whereas this approach to modeling learning from policy 
outcomes in the past and in other countries is sugges-
tive, it is certainly only a first step and certainly not prob-
lem free. Other questions that I have not addressed here 
due to space constraints relate to modeling external 
shocks, how to model the time series component of the 
updating process, and alternative ways to specify prior 
beliefs to address similar problems. In any case, Bayes-
ian updating as a tool is a step forward in comparison to 
the few attempts so far to model learning from others and 
ideational change and to test its impact on the likelihood 
of policy switches. In that sense, it is a promising meth-
odological tool for the internationalist interested in spatial 
interdependence.  
 
—————————————————————————- 
8 In this particular illustration, I do not use updates of the 
variability of growth outcomes.  
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Table. 1. Probability of Privatizing 
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; z-scores in parentheses; all variables lagged one year.  
  All Countries 
(1) 
OECD 
(2) 
LA 
(3) 
CONSTANT 
  
  
-2.60*** 
(-5.92) 
-4.56*** 
(-3.72) 
-6.45*** 
(-3.06) 
LEARNING FROM OWN RESULTS 
  
0.11 
(1.45) 
0.04 
(0.34) 
0.32* 
(1.87) 
  
LEARNING FROM AVERAGE REGIONAL 
RESULTS 
  
 
 0.16* 
        (1.72) 
 
    -0.63 
        (-1.22) 
 
     1.36** 
      (2.55) 
LEARNING FROM AVERAGE WORLD  
RESULTS 
0.21** 
(2.22) 
0.59** 
(2.10) 
-0.99 
(-1.12) 
 
EMULATION 
  
  
0.60*** 
(5.06) 
  
0.49*** 
(3.39) 
  
1.12*** 
(3.60) 
COERCION 0.22 
(0.74) 
-0.08 
(-0.12) 
0.50 
(1.15) 
IDEOLOGY 
  
0.08 
(0.79) 
0.25* 
(1.74) 
-0.37 
(-1.59) 
REGIME 
  
-0.28E-2 
(-0.10) 
0.02 
(0.60) 
-0.14** 
(-2.30) 
INFLATION 
  
0.08 
(0.24) 
1.61 
(0.68) 
-0.22 
(-0.43) 
EU 0.20 
(0.71) 
0.23 
(0.78) 
  
  
YEAR 1990 0.35 
(0.95) 
0.45 
(0.87) 
2.24** 
(2.43) 
Log Likelihood -169.37 -94.02 -48.95 
LR Chi-Square 399.15 285.87 165.69 
P-Value for F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 533 342 191 
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second country (countryj) is the potential “sender”. Each 
country enters the dataset twice, both as potential 
“adopter” and as potential “sender”. Thus, the France-
Germany dyad is different from Germany-France. In the 
first, France can potentially “receive” a policy from Ger-
many, while in the second it is the other way around. 
Such a dataset includes all potential combinations of 
countries, except, of course, same-country dyads (for 
example, Germany-Germany). The number of dyads is 
therefore equal to n * (n-1), where n is the number of 
countries. This approach has been used for a long time 
in the international relations literature because many 
outcomes of interests, such as war or trade, are rela-
tional, but it has been adapted to the study of policy diffu-
sion only recently (Volden, 2006).  
The adaptation comes with a twist. In the context of 
diffusion, influence, unlike war or trade, cannot be meas-
ured at the dyadic level because it is unobservable; in-
deed, the whole point of the analysis is to find out 
whether such influence actually exists and what it looks 
like. Thus, the dependent variable has to be defined in 
terms of potential influence, or “imitation”. Usually, it is 
coded 1 if, in a given year, countryi takes up a policy that 
countryj already had in the previous year. In other words, 
“imitation” so defined is a subset of policy change: it in-
cludes only those changes that move countryi closer to 
countryj.  
In itself, observing that countryi adopts a policy that 
countryj already had is of course no evidence of diffu-
sion. It may very well be that countryi changed its policy 
completely independently for reasons that have nothing 
to do with mutual influence, and that its increased simi-
larity with countryj is purely coincidental. Therefore, the 
goal of the analysis is to find out whether there are any 
systematic patterns of “imitation” For instance, do some 
characteristics of countryj (such as its “success”) or of 
the relationship between countryi and countryj (such as 
the similarity of their exports, which is a measure of com-
petition) make imitation more likely? Although mutual 
influence is unobservable, the detection of systematic 
patterns of imitation can help make inferences about the 
underlying diffusion process. The distinct advantage of 
the dyadic approach is that variables measuring the rela-
Introduction 
In recent years, researchers in many political science 
subfields, including comparative and international politi-
cal economy, comparative politics, international relations, 
and public policy, have directed increased efforts to the 
study of how policy choices in one country are shaped by 
prior policy choices in other countries, or in other words, 
how policies diffuse internationally (see for example Sim-
mons, Dobbin and Garrett, 2008). One argument is that 
countries learn from one another, as foreign experiences 
supply useful information on the likely consequences of 
policy change (see Meseguer, this issue), but there are 
other reasons why policies diffuse, including competition 
(governments act strategically to attract resources) and 
emulation (norm dynamics alter the relative attractive-
ness of policies, regardless of their objective properties).  
These ideas are appealing, but how can we know if 
diffusion really happens, and if it does, what drives it? In 
the quantitative toolbox, spatial methods are the main 
option. Diffusion is modeled through spatial lags, namely 
weighted averages of the lagged dependent variable in 
which theoretically more relevant countries (e.g. competi-
tors, or more successful examples) have greater 
influence (see Franzese and Hays, this issue).  
In this note, I discuss an alternative, namely the dy-
adic approach, in which units of analysis are not coun-
tries but pairs of countries (dyads). I first outline the logic 
of this approach, and then I discuss its main advantages 
and problems.  
Basics 
In the dyadic approach, the units of analysis are pairs 
of countries. The first country in each dyad (countryi) is 
defined as the potential “adopter” of a policy, while the 
FABRIZIO  
GILARDI 
  
————————————————————————— 
1 I thank the editorial team of the C&M Newsletter, and 
especially Damian Raess, for helpful comments. The 
note summarizes arguments developed in Gilardi and 
Füglister (2008).  
Interdependence And Policy  
Diffusion: The Dyadic Approach1 
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tionship between the two countries, as well as their indi-
vidual characteristics, can be easily integrated in the 
analysis. Thus, diffusion hypotheses can be tested di-
rectly.  
Concretely, dyadic models have the following form:  
where yijt is a vector of relational outcomes, α is the inter-
cept, Xijt is a matrix of dyadic measures, Vit is a matrix of 
measures for the characteristics of countryi, Wjt is a ma-
trix of measures for countryj, εijt is the error term, and β, 
γ, and δ are vectors of coeffcients to be estimated. In 
other words, the model can include information on the 
relationship between countryi and countryj, such as the 
extent to which they compete for the same resources, as 
well as of the characteristics of countryj, such as the suc-
cess of its policy, and of course the characteristics of 
countryi. This means that, provided that good measures 
and data exist, diffusion hypotheses can be tested di-
rectly, and the importance of learning, competition, and 
emulation can be assessed empirically. 
In most cases, the dependent variable is dichoto-
mous, and the model is essentially a time-series cross-
section model with a binary dependent variable.  
These models can usually be estimated using ordi-
nary logit or probit with corrections for time dependence 
(Beck, Katz and Tucker, 1998), but the specific dyadic 
setup introduces additional complications, which I ad-
dress in the next section. 
Pitfalls and promises 
It is well-known that time-series cross-section analysis 
comes with many problems, but the dyadic setup has its 
own set of issues. A first concern are the complex de-
pendencies that are introduced in the data through the 
particular construction of the dataset. Observations are 
non-independent not only within the same dyad over 
time (for example, France-Germany at time t, France-
Germany at time t + 1, and so on), but also for dyads 
sharing the same countryi (such as France-Germany and 
France-Italy) or the same countryj (for instance, France-
Germany and Italy-Germany). There is no easy solution, 
but some help could come from multilevel modeling, 
which allows the specification of random effects at three 
levels: countryi, countryj, and year. In other words, the 
intercept is allowed to vary across these levels, which 
helps address dependencies as well as cross-sectional 
(or cross-dyad) heterogeneity, which is another concern 
of dyadic analyses (King, 2001).  
A second problem is linked to the construction of the 
dependent variable. Given the procedure explained in 
the previous section, in some cases the probability of 
imitation is exactly zero. This happens for those observa-
tions in which countryj has not (yet) adopted the new 
policy. This condition may hold for a non-trivial share of 
observations, which in some way are analogous to ob-
servations outside the risk-set in standard event-history 
analysis. The nature of this problem and its conse-
quences are still unclear, but it seems advisable that 
such observations be dropped from the analysis 
(Boehmke, 2008). Intuitively, it makes sense to restrict 
the analysis to the cases for which imitation is not ruled 
out by construction.  
Despite these problems, the dyadic approach has 
many advantages. Most notably, the possibility directly to 
include measures of the characteristics of countryj per-
mits to answer questions such as "are the policies of 
successful countries more likely to be imitated?" For 
instance, in his dyadic study of the diffusion of Children’s 
Health Insurance Programs in the U.S., Volden (2006) 
found that the policies of states that managed to in-
crease the number of insured children, which is a meas-
ure of success, were more likely to be adopted else-
where. Spatial methods can do the same if an indicator 
of success is used as weight in the spatial lags, but the 
evidence is more indirect, since spatial lags are aver-
ages, that is, aggregated measures of the experience of 
others. The same logic holds for indicators of the rela-
tionship between countryi and countryj, such as geo-
graphic proximity or trade patterns.  
In my own application of the dyadic approach, I 
asked whether all policy makers are equally likely to 
learn, and, to the extent that they do, what they learn 
about (Gilardi, 2008). First, ideology and prior beliefs 
regarding the consequences of policy change filter the 
impact of new information. For instance, right-wing politi-
cians who firmly believe that generous unemployment 
benefits prevent the labor market from working smoothly 
will not change their minds easily when confronted with 
conflicting evidence. By contrast, more moderate policy 
makers will be more likely to revise their beliefs if new 
information shows that generous benefits are not associ-
ated with high unemployment rates. Second, policy mak-
ers certainly care about the policy consequences of re-
forms (in this example, the unemployment rate), but they 
are also likely to be concerned about the political fallout. 
What are the electoral consequences of cutting benefits? 
Is it compatible with political survival?  
The dyadic analysis of 18 OECD countries over 23 
years (therefore 18 * (18-1) = 306 dyads and 306*23 = 
7038 observations) allowed me to include directly meas-
ures of both policy success (measured as change in the 
unemployment rate) and political success (measured as 
change in the vote share of the incumbent party) in coun-
tryj, as well as a key characteristic of countryi, namely 
government partisanship. The results show that, as ex-
pected, right governments in countryi were more likely to 
imitate cuts in benefits, but more so if the electoral per-
formance of the incumbent party in countryj was rela-
tively good. By contrast, policy outcomes in countryj were 
less systematically related to imitation by countryi. These 
findings suggest that preferences and prior beliefs about 
the consequences of reforms may lead policy makers to 
discount information on policy outcomes, while political 
consequences are taken into account more consistently. 
 
,ijtjtitijtijt WVXy εδβα γ ++++=
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Conclusion 
Interdependence and policy diffusion are important social 
phenomena that have attracted the interest of a growing 
number of scholars in political science. Spatial models 
are one quantitative option to analyze policy diffusion 
processes empirically. This note has briefly presented an 
alternative, namely the dyadic approach, which takes 
pairs of countries as units of analysis and asks whether 
certain theoretically interesting characteristics of the 
dyad (that is, measures of learning, competition, and 
emulation) make it more likely that one country takes up 
the policies of the other. This approach is not unproblem-
atic and, as with any method, unreflective use is to be 
avoided. However, careful applications can lead to a 
more direct mea‐surement of policy diffusion processes 
and a better understanding of the mechanisms through 
which policies spread within and across countries.  
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The C&M Newsletter 1/2007 featured an article of mine 
on methodological problems of the concept of policy(-
oriented) learning (Biegelbauer 2007a) and a response 
by Loeber in its 1/2008 edition (Loeber 2008). The IPSA 
Committee on Concepts and Methods, in this case 
through its Newsletter, thereby provided "a forum of de-
bate between methodological schools who otherwise 
tend to conduct their deliberations on separate ta-
bles" (http://www.concepts-methods.org; retrieved 12-11-
2008). At social science faculties we teach a lot, but re-
grettably not what to do when you find the food on two 
tables equally enticing. 
Loeber conjures up an attractive dish on one of the 
tables by advancing a broader conception of policy learn-
ing than I do. The food I prepared on another table con-
sists of a smaller number of ingredients and is more nar-
rowly focused on the methodological problems a number 
of contributions utilising policy learning approaches are 
suffering from.1 I argue that these are stemming from 
unclear definitions, shaky operationalisations and little 
discussion of methodological choices (compare also with 
James and Lodge 2003, Maier et al 2003). In order to 
make my point on the two pages provided to me by the 
editors I followed the overwhelming majority of the policy 
learning literature and concentrated on the decision-
finding and -making phases of the heuristic policy cycle. 
Furthermore I chose not to discuss how knowledge and 
action relate to one another and left the relation of power 
and knowledge as a research desideratum. Loeber chal-
lenged me on all of these choices. 
Not only does Loeber's dish look attractive, she also 
cuts the cake that comes for dessert (Loeber 2008, 11) in 
an interesting way that is much more than just decora-
tive. She locates policy learning as part of a broader un-
derstanding of the activities of people based on knowl-
edge that continuously is being tested and assessed 
when actors negotiate their environment in the frame-
work of their daily activities. Thereby she places her un-
derstanding of social actors in a school of thought, which 
has been termed "social/political practices" (for an over-
view on political practices see Wagenaar/Cook 2003; on 
social practices see Reckwitz 2003). The theoretical ba-
sis of the rather diverse group of practice approaches 
often is the work of Giddens (1984; also quoted by Loe-
ber), Bourdieu (1977), but also others (compare Schatzki 
1997).  
Practice approaches have a number of intellectually 
enticing features, such as the promise to look at the ac-
tual activities of people (and less at how they later on 
rationalise them or at how others interpret all of these 
activities). This includes the often ignored daily routines 
that are structuring our lives and are significant for the 
ways in which we are dealing with our environments 
(Wagenaar 2004, Amin/Roberts 2008). What makes 
practice approaches so interesting for research on policy 
learning is that one of the defining features of social and 
political practices is that they are based on a sort of prac-
tical knowledge developed and enacted in the doings of 
actors (Cook/Brown 1999). In the case of policies (but 
also politics) this means that all practices leading to a 
policy are indeed based on practical knowledge and are 
subject to ongoing learning processes, regardless if car-
ried out by relatively speaking powerful or powerless 
actors, by politicians debating, by civil servants drafting, 
by journalists writing about or students protesting against 
a new law proposal.  
By making use of the idea of practical knowledge 
learning becomes the basis of political practices quite 
naturally and is much more inclusive than is the case for 
much of the research on policy learning until now. This 
places the researcher interested in policy learning into an 
advantageous position, as appropriately described by 
Loeber. Not only come all political practices by all actors 
Which Table Should We Take?  
A Comment On Loeber, On Concep-
tualisations And Methodologies Of 
Policy Learning 
 
PETER S. 
BIEGELBAUER 
——————————————————————-- 
1 A broader overview on policy learning was published 
in fall of 2007 (Biegelbauer 2007b). 
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into the focus adding to our understanding of the relation 
between knowledge and action, but also the other parts 
of the heuristic policy cycle command our attention now. 
After all what difference does it make if political practices 
based on practical knowledge are changed in the agenda 
setting, policy making or implementation phases? 
Thereby also our opportunities to observe policy learning 
are multiplying in comparison to much of the literature on 
the topic that is focusing on the policy design phases (as 
still does most of the policy analysis research, Loeber's 
comments on Majone and Wildavsky's work  aside - re-
grettably I should say). 
Having praised Loeber's take on policy learning I am 
still tempted to switch tables every now and then. As I 
have pointed out, on the one hand I do believe that prac-
tice approaches are highly interesting and hold a number 
of promises. Yet some of these promises still have to be 
realised as the work on social and political practices is at 
times still quite elusive and sometimes uses concepts 
focussing on very specific practices. From a position of 
sympathy2 I dare to say that this is an innovative school 
of thought in which a lot of work is waiting to be done in 
terms of spelling out more completely what social and 
political practices are and what their explanatory value 
for social action is.  
On the other hand I think that cognitive approaches 
to policy learning are interesting, too. I agree with Loeber 
that it is also important that we do not forget the lessons 
of constructivism regarding the way we interpret the 
world not on the basis of some objective truth that is 
“somewhere out there, just waiting for us”, but rather on 
the basis of our own beliefs about the world - and, in the 
case of policy communities or subsystems, on the basis 
of whole belief systems (Sabatier/Jenkins-Smith 1999). 
Loeber is also right in emphasising that the framing of 
policies should be factored into an attempt to understand 
policy learning as it does make a difference what the 
actual context of a policy is and how the policy relates to 
the context (Rein/Schön 1994). But there is no reason 
why the role of attitudes, policy ideas and worldviews as 
well as framing and meaning-making should have no 
place in research on policy learning based on a cognitive 
view. 
Moreover I would like to defend the focus on policy 
design chosen for my article in the Newsletter and by 
much of the research on policy learning.3 For reasons of 
research pragmatism it is often enough the only sensible 
choice as there is more information on this policy phase 
than on any other. Decision-finding and decision-making 
are in the limelight of public discussion and therefore 
reflected in newspaper and journal articles, TV discus-
sions, books and other potential research material. Re-
searchers utilising an approach such as policy learning 
which focuses on developments taking place in policy-
making over a decade or so (Sabatier/Jenkins-Smith 
1999, Bandelow 2003) typically will not be able to rely 
only on their own original research results, but they often 
enough will have to use whatever material is available.  
A key point for Loeber is the effort to provide insights 
into the relation between power and knowledge. Indeed 
she is right that, similar to much literature on policy learn-
ing, I left this issue as a research desideratum. Of course 
the same could be said about many practice approaches, 
which shy away from dealing with the issue of power 
(Schatzki 1997, Reckwitz 2003), albeit not all (Hörning 
2001). Other interpretative schools of thought have less 
of a problem with including power as an important cate-
gory in theory-building. An example is discourse analy-
sis, many proponents of which are building upon the 
work of Foucault (1980), who understood power as a 
multidimensional relational concept, with power ubiqui-
tously saturating all social spheres and relations (Hajer 
2003, Gottweis 2003). 
A final point Loeber takes up in her article is the 
question of who the subjects of learning are: who does 
the learning? I am not dealing with that issue in my 
Newsletter article, although it concerns me in my re-
search on policy learning, in which frequently civil ser-
vants play the main role and not politicians (for example 
Biegelbauer 2007c, Biegelbauer/Mayer 2008). To me 
there seems to be a tendency in the application of cogni-
tive approaches in research on policy learning to concen-
trate on the role of individuals. Once again I agree with 
Loeber, when she states that it is important to under-
stand learning as a social activity, which by definition 
cannot be carried out by a single person alone. On the 
same token it is possible to focus on social learning tak-
ing place on the level of a policy field, on the organisa-
tions and groups of which a policy field consists, or on 
the individuals, who ultimately are making up organisa-
tions and groups. Depending on the level of analysis 
chosen different insights into mechanisms of policy learn-
ing are possible, as are exemplified by the difference 
between the practical-minded work of Rose (2005), the 
more academic and theory-driven research of Sabatier/
Jenkins-Smith (1999) and the community management-
oriented “communities of practice” approach by Wenger 
(1998). Undoubtedly our understanding of the role of 
learning in policy-making has increased with the applica-
tion of each of these theoretical lenses on policies. 
In order to find our place in the community/ies in the 
social sciences we are sometimes expected to find only 
one sort of foodstuff palatable, quantitative or qualitative, 
mainstream or interpretive, positivist or constructivist. For 
the time being I will go on switching tables, catering to 
my research interests at will. It seems to me that the 
choosing of different tables every now and then makes 
my life as a researcher more interesting. 
 
———————————————————————- 
2 Stemming amongst other things from the fact that I am 
currently co-editing with Dirk Jörke from Greifswald 
University a volume of the Austrian Political Science 
Journal on political practices (Österreichische 
Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 01/2009). 
——————————————————————– 
3 I was lucky enough to find rich material for my own 
case studies on policy learning and did not have to 
restrain myself to the policy design phase (see, for 
example, Biegelbauer 2007c; Biegelbauer/Mayer 
forthcoming). 
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cept formation as well as operationalization and measu-
rement.  
While the first two IPSA C&M and CIDE awards sought 
to recognize innovative work in the more narrow field of 
„democratic studies,“ the award is now targeting concep-
tual innovation in the broader field of comparative poli-
tics. 
 
SUBMISSIONS 
Submissions are open to authors, journal editors, and 
book publishers. Jury members, too, may suggest candi-
dates.  
We encourage self-nominations. When submitting the 
work of others, please make sure you have obtained the 
express consent of the author.  
Board members of the Committee on Concepts and Me-
thods are banned from participation.  
Submissions must include:  
• four copies of the work you submit, 
• mailing address, phone, fax, and e-mail of the 
author, and 
• mailing address, phone, fax, and e-mail of the per-
son who submits (if different from author). 
 
Please, submit nominations by mail to: 
 
Andreas Schedler 
C&M Vice-Chair 
CIDE  
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas 
Department of Political Studies 
Carretera México Toluca 3655 
Col. Lomas de Santa Fé 
Del. Alvaro Obregón 
CP 01210 Mexico City 
Mexico 
 
All submissions must reach us before 31 December 
2008. 
 
JURY 
For each award, the Committee on Concepts and Me-
thods nominates a jury composed of three distinguished 
scholars in field of comparative politics.  
The 2009 jury will be formed by James L. Gibson 
(Washington University in St. Louis), winner of the previ-
ous award and chairperson of the jury, John Gerring 
(Boston University), and Mark Bevir (University of Califor-
nia at Berkeley). 
The jury will seek consensual decisions. In case of di-
sagreement, it will rule by majority. Jury decisions are 
final.  
PRICE MONEY 
The winner of the price will be awarded 1.500 USD (one 
thousand five hundred US Dollars). At the jury’s discreti-
on, the price is divisible between various winners.  
A L L  F O R  
S U B M I S S I O N S  
 
2009 Award for Conceptional 
Innovation in Comparative 
Politics 
C 
IPSA Committee on Concepts and Methods (C&M 
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), 
Mexico  
The Committee on Concepts and Methods (C&M) of the 
International Political Science Association and the Centro 
de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) in Mexi-
co City invite submissions to the third tri-annual Award 
for Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Politics.  
 
The award is given every three years at the World Cong-
ress of the International Political Science Association
(IPSA) 
 
2003 Award 
The first was awarded in 2003 to Gerardo L. Munck 
(University of Southern California) and Jay Verkuilen 
(University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) for their ar-
ticle „Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evalu-
ating Alternative Indices,“ published in Comparative Poli-
tical Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1, February 2002, pp. 5-34.  
 
2006 Award 
The 2006 Award for Conceptual Innovation in Democra-
tic Studies was granted to James L Gibson, Sidney W. 
Souers Professor of Government at Washington Univer-
sity in St. Louis, for his book Overcoming Apartheid. Can 
Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation? (New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation, 2004). 
The third award will be given at the 2009 IPSA World 
Congress in Santiago de Chile.  
 
CRITERIA 
The III CIDE-C&M award will be given to a scholarly work 
published any time between 1 January 2006 and 31 De-
cember 2008.  
Any category of formal publication may be submitted, 
whether it is a book, book chapter, or journal article.  
 
The idea of „conceptual innovation“ is to be understood 
broadly. It is intended to cover concept analysis and con-
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S u p p o r t e d  b y 
C & M  w o r k i n g  p a p e r s  
The C&M working paper series are published by the 
COMMITTEE ON CONCEPTS AND METHODS (C&M), the 
Research Committee No. 1 of the INTERNATIONAL PO-
LITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION (IPSA), hosted at CIDE in 
Mexico City. C&M working papers are meant to share 
work in progress in a timely way before formal publica-
tion. The Committee publishes two series of working 
papers:  
Political Concepts contains work of excellence on 
political concepts and political language. It seeks to 
include innovative contributions to concept analysis, 
language usage, concept operationalization, and 
measurement.  
Political Methodology contains work of excellence on 
methods and methodology in the study of politics. It 
invites innovative work on fundamental questions of 
research design, the construction and evaluation of 
empirical evidence, theory building and theory testing. 
The series welcomes, and hopes to foster, contribu-
tions that cut across conventional methodological di-
vides, as between quantitative and qualitative methods, 
or between interpretative and observational ap-
proaches.  
SUBMISSIONS 
All papers are subject to review by either a member of 
the Editorial Board or an external reviewer. Only Eng-
lish-language papers can be admitted. Authors inter-
ested in including their work in the C&M Working Paper 
Series may seek initial endorsement by one editorial 
board member: w w w . c o n c e p t s - m e t h o d s . o r g. 
Alternatively, they may send their paper by e-mail to: 
workingpapers@concepts-methods.org. 
Authors bear full responsibility for the content of their 
contribution. All rights reserved. 
ACCESS 
The C&M webpage offers full access to past working 
papers as well as to commentaries by readers: 
www.concepts-methods.org 
The IPSA Committee on 
Concepts and Methods (C & M) 
The IPSA COMMITTEE ON CONCEPTS AND METHODS 
(C&M) promotes conceptual and methodological discus-
sion in political science. It provides a forum of debate 
between methodological schools who otherwise tend to 
conduct their deliberations on separate tables. It grants 
the tri-annual “Award for Conceptual Innovation in De-
mocratic Studies,” publishes two series of working pa-
pers, “Political Concepts” and “Political Methods,” and 
coordinates “Les Intraduisibles: The Dictionary of Un-
translatable Terms in Politics”. 
Chairperson: Andreas Schedler (CIDE, Mexico City), 
www.concepts-methods.org 
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